Chapter 6
The Relationship between Votes and Seats
Introduction
As noted earlier, in Lok Sabha elections, a single representative for each of 543 constituencies is elected -on the basis of obtaining the largest number of votes of all the candidates contesting that constituency -as a Member of the Lok Sabha for that constituency. This system of election is called the First-Past-the-Post (FPTP) system. The disjoint, under this system, between the votes obtained and the seats won by a party frequently causes consternation. Unlike a proportional electoral system, in which a party's share of the total vote is a good predictor of its share of parliamentary seats, the relation between seats and votes in a FPTP system often works in mysterious ways. In this chapter we attempt to understand some of these mysteries in respect of General Parliamentary Elections in India. This chapter is concerned with analysing the fortunes of India's two largest political parties, the Indian National Congress (INC) and the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) and in the context of the above remarks this chapter examines, in some detail, the relationship between the votes obtained and the seats won by the INC and the BJP.
The starting point of the analysis is the Law of the Cubic Proportion according to which, in a two-party contest, "the proportion of seats won by the victorious party varies as the cube of the proportion of votes cast for that party in the country as a whole" (Kendall and Stuart (1950) p. 183).
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In this chapter we take a different approach to this 'law' by separately computing for the INC and BJP 1 Kendall and Stuart (1950) draw attention to the fact that the law was first proposed by James Parker Smithwho, in turn attributed it to P.A. MacMahon -in evidence before the Royal Commission on Systems of Elections (2010) . the coefficient which equates the proportion of their votes to the proportion of their seats. We term this the amplification coefficient and show that its value is very different for the two parties. Since the BJP gained political traction only from the 1989 General Election -when it won 85 seats, having won just two seats in the previous General Election of 1984 -the analysis in this chapter is confined to eight General Elections: 1989 Elections: , 1991 Elections: , 1996 Elections: , 1998 Elections: , 1999 Elections: , 2004 Elections: , 2009 , and 2014. Given our interest in the two leading protagonists, the INC and the BJP, the focus of the analysis was those constituencies in which there was an INC and/or a BJP candidate so that constituencies in which there was neither an INC nor a BJP candidate were excluded from the analysis. Table 6 .2 shows that of the total of 4,323 constituencies in the eight Lok Sabha elections between 1989 and 2014 there were only 245 constituencies which neither party contested (5.7 percent of the total) and 2,837 constituencies which were contested by both parties (65.6 percent of the total). 
The Electoral Fortunes of the INC and the BJP
V V < is the ratio of votes accruing to parties A and B, then for some real number α, we must have:
We refer to the term α as the amplification coefficient because it amplifies the votes ratio into a seats ratio. For example, if α=3 and the vote ratio is 40/60 (that is, 1:1.5 meaning that for every vote obtained by party A, party B obtains 1.5 votes), then the seats ratio will be (40) 3 /(60) 3 , that is 1: 3.4, meaning that for every seat won by party A, party B would win 3.4 seats. So, if there were 100 seats contested, parties A and B would win 23 and 77 seats, respectively.
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The value α = 3 embodies the 'Law of the Cubic Proportion' of election results under a FPTP system (Kendall and Stuart, 1951; Rajagopalan, 1959; Curtice and Steed, 1986; Norris and Crewe, 1994) . In general, of course, the value of α will be different from 3. Indeed, for any given election, it is possible to solve for, α, the amplification coefficient associated with that election as: 4. There could be the outcome when parties A and B obtain the same number of votes (
but win different numbers of seats (
S S ≠ ). In this case, the denominator of equation (2) is zero and α will not be defined.
5. There could be the outcome in which party A obtains fewer votes than party B but wins more seats: but
In this situation the numerator in equation (2) is positive, with the denominator negative, so that α<0. V V S S > < . In this situation the numerator in equation (2) is negative, with the denominator positive, so that α<0. This is a situation in which where the party A's majority in votes fails to translate into a parliamentary majority.
Independent candidates (Party B in the above analysis); in the second instance we compare the BJP (Party A in the above analysis) with the collective of non-BJP parties, including Independent candidates (Party B in the above analysis). <Table 6.3> Table 6 One can verify that the amplification coefficients are correctly calculated by computing the total number seats that a party would have won and comparing these with the numbers actually won:
these should be identical if α has been correctly computed. In order to do so, define
where α represents the value of the amplification coefficient computed using equation (6.2); then, from equation (6.1), the computed number of seats won by party A, is: Remembering that a lower value of α is more desirable than a higher value, Table 6 .3 shows that the value of α was smaller for the BJP than the INC for six -1989, 1996, 1998, 1999, 2004 The BJP did not have this problem: as Table 6 .3 shows, in each of the eight elections the value of its amplification coefficient was less than one meaning that is was able to neutralise some of its vote disadvantage, relative to the non-BJP parties, in terms of its seat disadvantage. For example, in 2009, with α=0.89, for every vote won by the BJP, the non-BJP parties won 4.3 votes but, for every seat won by the BJP, the non-BJP parties won 3.7 seats. Thus the essential difference between the BJP and the INC was that, compared to the INC, the BJP was more efficient in translating votes into seats.
In order to understand this measure of this inefficiency consider a party which targets, say, 200 (out of a total of 543) seats in the Lok Sabha. Then, from equation (6.2), the vote ratio which will deliver this is: 
Hindi Speaking States
In earlier chapters we had drawn attention to the importance of Hindi-speaking ( V V S S ) were both higher in the non-HS states than in the HS states and its amplification coefficient was more favourable: bearing in mind that, as discussed earlier, a lower value of the amplification coefficient is more desirable than a higher value, the amplification coefficient for the INC was always lower in the non-HS, than in the HS, states; conversely, the amplification coefficient for the BJP was always lower in the HS, than in the non-HS, states.
In order to gain an appreciation of differences in inter-party electoral performance between the HS and non-HS states, suppose that the INC and the BJP each target one in three of the seats from the HS states (total 204 constituencies) and a similar proportion from the non-HS states (total 313 constituencies). Excluding the 2014 election, the average of the amplification coefficients over the last three elections (1999, 2004, and 2009) In other words, to win one-third of the seats in the HS states, the INC and the BJP would have required vote shares of, respectively, 35 (= 0.54/1.54) and 21 percent (= 0.27/1.27) in the HS states.
On the other hand, to win one in three seats in the non-HS 
Concluding Remarks
The contribution of this chapter was to develop the concept of the amplification coefficient which, when applied to the votes received and seats won by a party, could be used to assess its ability to convert votes into seats. In this respect, this chapter's major finding was that the BJP, in electoral terms, was much more efficient than the INC. This can be encapsulated in our finding that, averaging 
